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Staunch Democrat and Republican Unite on War Issue
By Caroline Sapp '09
STAFF WRITER
Morgan Roach '07
CONTRIBUTING WRITER

During this past semester, several of your fellow classmates have been devoting much of their time to a new course offering, “Terrorism and Insurgency,” taught by visiting faculty member Dr. Spencer Bakich. One of the primary questions the class has been pursuing is what it takes to design a successful counter-insurgent strategy.

We are both participants in a course that covers some rather controversial subject matter. While we have traditionally opposed political affiliations, we share a common belief at the conclusion of this course: America should not pull out of Iraq in March of 2008, as suggested by the current Congress.

We began the class by defining insurgency. Insurgency is the struggle of a non-ruling group using political resources and violence to reformulate or destroy the basis of legitimacy of the ruling authority. While some scholars believe that the situation in Iraq is a civil war, for the purpose of the Terrorism and Insurgency class, we have decided that it is an insurgency.

However, Iraq is not a singular insurgency. It is several insurgencies contained within one state. There is a struggle between the Shia, the current ruling class, and the Sunni, the deposed minority. There is also a struggle between the secular government and the religious tribesmen of the various provinces of Iraq.

Between the beginning of the invasion in 2003 and December 2006 the U.S. has not been conducting a counter-insurgent strategy in Iraq. Much like we fought World War II and the Gulf War, the military conducted the war with a focus on technology and manpower.

In other words, we fought by throwing the best and brightest equipped with the newest weapons technology available. Yet, the U.S. is still entrenched in Iraq. This is because until December 2006, we were not fighting an insurgency. We were fighting as if against another state.

Enter General David H. Petraeus, February 2007. President Bush appointed the recent author of the Army’s new field manual on conducting counter-insurgency as the new U.S. commander in Iraq.

Unlike his predecessors, Petraeus understands that the situation in Iraq requires a different strategy. The many insurgent groups do not fight for large scale territorial control or military dominance, but for the legitimacy gained from the support of the different peoples of Iraq.

Petreaus’ strategy is two fold: unity and cultural awareness. During the first three years there was no coherent strategy to the war; it differed from leader to leader in each province. There was confusion as to the responsibilities of the troops on the ground because there were no defined goals, such as the ability to provide security for the people.

Petreaus also recognizes the need for the troops to be educated in appropriate social conduct as well as basic communication skills. The Iraqis cannot be won over if they do not trust American troops. Both of these components contribute to the ultimate goal of achieving the legitimacy of a government established with the assistance of American troops.

How do we know that this strategy has any chance of succeeding? The partial success of American troops in the Tal Afar province is one such instance. Colonel H.R. McMaster and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment arrived in Tal Afar in February 2005. Col. McMaster led a unified effort within the province based on tactics similar to those suggested by Petreaus.

McMaster’s’ officers dealt directly not only with leading Shia tribesmen, but Sunni tribesmen as well. Also, all of the troops of McMaster command received training in cultural proceedings in Iraq before deployment. During the time in which McMaster was stationed in Tal Afar, the amount of violence enacted by insurgent members was the lowest in the area. Furthermore, the opposing groups sat in negotiations daily.

After U.S. forces left in July of 2006, violence in Tal Afar increased dramatically. This was a result of the loss of McMaster’s’ unifying ideology. Because the military was unwilling to give McMaster’s and his troops enough time to complete their work in Tal Afar, violence continues to escalate in the province.

Why though should the US not pull out of Iraq? Through the example of Tal Afar, we can observe that it is possible to achieve peace and stability in Iraq. However, it takes the proper strategy and time to achieve success.

The United States should adopt a unified strategy with specified goals, such as a culturally acceptable form of government. Furthermore, troops should be trained in basic cultural practices of Iraq, including language (verbal and body) and social traditions, before deployment to the area.

When the troops arrive, instead of adopting wartime posture, troops should be policing areas, and interacting with the local population. Both of these changes would lead to better intelligence and a higher level of cooperation, thus leading to a higher level of political legitimacy.

However, if the US is unwilling to fully dedicate its time to the mission, such actions would be futile considering insurgencies often take 10 to 15 years to successfully defeat. The American public signed off on this war, and it must be willing to pay the price of war over a generation of time.

If the public chooses this path, Americans will not only have to endure the economic price tag but accept a retinue of negative media attention. Therefore, if the U.S. wishes to complete its mission, a March 2008 pullout is an unrealistic goal.

However, if the U.S. does not wish to dedicate its resources to completing the mission, we should not wait to pull out in March 2008. If military is forced to accept the latter plan, the approaching 11 months would simply be a waste of resources and lives.